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We investigated primary and secondary psychopathy and the ability to detect high-stakes, 
real-life emotional lies in an on-line experiment (N = 150). Using signal detection analysis, 
we found that lie detection ability was overall above chance level, there was a tendency 
towards responding liberally to the test stimuli, and women were more accurate than men 
Further, sex moderated the relationship between psychopathy and lie detection ability; in 
men, primary psychopathy had a significant positive correlation with the ability to detect lies, 
whereas in women there was a significant negative correlation with deception detection. The 
results are discussed with reference to evolutionary theory and sex differences in processing 
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Introduction 
Decades of research in the field of lie detection have argued against the notion that 
most people are better than chance at identifying liars (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2008). 
However, major disagreement still exists as to whether there are individual differences in lie 
detection ability and, if so, what individual characteristics may associate with greater 
accuracy (Bond & Uysal, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2007). For example, Bond and DePaulo (2008) 
conducted a meta-analysis on several studies, and found that people showed little variation in 
deception detection accuracy, casting doubt on the existence of lie detection wizards 
(O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004). Nevertheless, there may be yet undiscovered individual 
characteristics that enhance deception detection (Baker, ten Brinke & Porter, 2012). In this 
respect, an especially relevant domain of individual differences across people is the ability to 
make decisions and judgments based on the identification and recognition of emotions in 
others (O’Sullivan, 2005). 
Social intelligence (e.g., emotional intelligence and Theory of Mind) relate to 
increased emotion recognition ability (Mier et al., 2010; Petrides & Furnham, 2003). 
Individuals with high social intelligence are expected to have enhanced capacity to detect 
emotional cues in faces, presumably leading to superior lie detection ability (O’Sullivan, 
2005). For example, Sylwester et al (2012) found that higher scores on a Theory of Mind 
measure had an association with enhanced accuracy of detecting co-operators in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game. However, social intelligence may also relate to more compassionate 
reactions to emotional lies, thus hindering the ability to detect emotional deception (Baker, 
ten Brinke, & Porter, 2012).  Rather than improving lie detection, perhaps the ability to 
perceive emotions in others is related to higher gullibility, or the tendency to rate liars as 
being truthful. It is possible that individuals who are low in emotional intelligence may be 
less detracted by hot emotional messages, and be more able to concentrate on cold cues that 
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will aid in accurate detection (Peace & Sinclair, 2012). One way to measure emotional 
intelligence is via psychopathy, a trait characterised by low emotional intelligence and 
empathy (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009; Jonason, Lyons, Bethell, & Ross, 
2013; Malterer, Glass, & Newman, 2008; Wai, & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Here, we were 
interested in investigating whether individual differences in psychopathy were associated 
with differences in the ability to detect deceptive, high-stake emotional lies. 
Although psychopathy has been widely researched in relation to lie production 
(Giammarco et al., 2012; Klaver, Lee, Spidel, & Hart, 2009; Porter, Brinke, Baker, & 
Wallace, 2011), not many have looked at the role of psychopathic traits in deception 
detection. The link between psychopathy and higher levels of self-reported lying (Giammarco 
et al., 2013), as well as lie production and deception detection ability (Wright, Berry, & Bird, 
2012), suggests that high psychopathy should be correlated with better lie detection ability. 
Interestingly, the few studies that have investigated this link have reported null results 
(Martin & Leach, 2013; Peace & Sinclair, 2012), although methodological limitations may 
account in part for this; Peace and Sinclair (2012), for instance, used written narratives, 
which have potentially low ecological validity (O’Sullivan, 2008). Furthermore, previous 
studies have not made a distinction between the sub-facets of psychopathy (i.e., primary and 
secondary), which can be quite different in their manifestations and aetiologies (McHoskey, 
Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998). 
The two sub-facets of psychopathy relate to inter-personal and affective deficits (viz., 
primary psychopathy), and anti-social impulsivity (viz., secondary psychopathy), respectively 
(McHoskey et al., 1998). Primary psychopaths are more likely to achieve success in the 
business world, whereas secondary psychopaths are more likely to populate prisons (Gao & 
Raine, 2010). These sub-facets are also slightly different in terms of emotional processing, 
primary psychopaths having weaker empathic responses (Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser, 
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McCrory, & Viding, 2011) and more accurate perception of fearful faces (Del Gaizo & 
Falkenbach, 2008) than secondary psychopaths. Therefore, we anticipate that primary 
psychopathy, but not secondary psychopathy, will be associated with better deception 
detection ability. 
It has been suggested that rather than being maladaptive, psychopathy could be a 
cheater-strategy, a specialisation for exploiting a specific social niche (Bergmüller, Schürch, 
& Hamilton, 2010; Glenn, Kurzban, & Raine, 2011). The exploitive inter-personal style of 
primary psychopaths could make them adept in achieving high societal positions (Boddy, 
2006), which could be aided by both enhanced lie detection and lie production capacity.   
Furthermore, psychopathy seems more like a male-typical trait (Cale & Lilienfeld, 2002), 
facilitating mating-related success in high psychopathy men (Jonason, Li, Webster, & 
Schmitt, 2009). Interestingly, primary psychopathy is manifested differently between the 
sexes, for example, via links between low empathy and high psychopathy in men, but not in 
women (Jonason et al., 2013). Low empathy could be a fitness-increasing adaptation for men, 
but not necessarily for women, who are high in primary psychopathy. We would expect that 
if high primary psychopathy is a male-typical adaptation for exploiting others, high 
psychopathy men would benefit more from enhanced lie detection ability. Secondary 
psychopathy, in turn, relates to deficits in decision making (Dean et al., 2012), and is less 
likely to be a heritable trait (Mealey, 1995). Hence, we expect that irrespective of participant 
sex, secondary psychopathy either relates to impaired lie detection, or has no relationship 
with lie detection at all. 
The present study aims to add to the existing literature by investigating the role of 
primary and secondary psychopathy in detecting deception in real-life, high-stakes situations. 
We expect that primary psychopathy, especially in male participants, will be related to 
enhanced lie detection ability. Furthermore, as age-related decline in both facets of 
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psychopathy has been reported (Gill & Crino, 2012), which could be linked to an age-related 
decline in competition for status and mates (Wilson & Daly, 1985), we limited our sample to 
participants who were between 18-30 years of age. 
Method 
Participants  
An on-line experiment, titled “lie detection and personality”, was advertised to 
students at a University in North-West England, who could participate in exchange for a 
course credit. In addition, the experiment was advertised to the community at large via the 
first author’s social networks, and on psychology research participation websites. After 
removing participants who were outside of the desired 18-30 age range (n = 50), individuals 
who indicated that they were familiar with one or more of the cases (n = 48), and outliers (n = 
3), the final sample consisted of 150 volunteers (Mage = 21.1, SD = 3.0; males = 40%). 
Materials  
We selected 26 real-life high stakes emotional television appeals (13 truthful, 13 lies). 
These appeals were based on real broadcasts from major television channels in the UK, US, 
and Australia: in each appeal, a person pleads for information on their loved ones who had 
gone missing or had been murdered. In half of the cases, the person pleading was later found 
guilty of murder. In the other half of the cases, someone else was convicted, or the missing 
person had been found. The appeals were from fathers (2 liars; 3 truthtellers) and mothers (4 
liars; 5 truthtellers) appealing for missing children, husbands (4 liars;1 truthteller) and wives 
(1 liar; 1 truthteller) appealing for a missing spouse, a sister appealing for a brother (1 
truthteller), daughters appealing for mothers (2 truthtellers), and strangers appealing for 
missing children (2 liars). Each video clip had duration between 15-45 seconds.  
The 64-item Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-III (Paulhus, Hemphill, & Hare, 2009) 
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was used to assess subclinical primary and secondary psychopathy. Participants rated how 
much they agreed (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with statements such as: “I 
enjoy driving at high speeds” and “I think I could beat a lie detector.” The items were 
averaged to create indices of secondary (α = .88) and primary (α = .92), psychopathy (r(150) 
= .70, p < .001). 
 
Procedure 
The first page of the on-line survey contained the participant information sheet and 
other relevant ethical information. Participants then completed the SRP-III, followed by the 
video-clips that were presented in randomized order for lies and truths. After viewing each 
clip, the participants were asked to indicate whether the person was lying or telling the truth. 
They were also asked whether they were familiar with each case. After completing the 
survey, participants were thanked, and presented with a full debrief. 
Results  
To estimate lie detection accuracy we calculated hit and false alarm rates for each 
individual first and then computed d' and c from these values as measures of discrimination 
and bias, respectively, following signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; 
Higham, Bruno & Perfect, 2010). The hit rate was calculated as the probability of a liar being 
correctly identified, whereas the false alarm rate was the probability that a non-liar was 
identified erroneously as a liar. d' and c were obtained after applying the Snodgrass and 
Corwin (1988) correction to the hit and false alarm rates. 
Descriptive statistics and sex differences for d', c, and primary and secondary 
psychopathy are reported in Table 1. Females were better than males at discriminating 
between liars and non-liars (d'), but there was no sex difference in bias (c). Men also scored 
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significantly higher than women in both primary and secondary psychopathy. Overall, the 
total sample showed an above-chance ability to tell liars (t(149) = 16.44, p < .001), and a 
general tendency towards liberalism (t(149) = 2.57, p = .01), indicating that participants were 
biased towards using the “liar” label, irrespective of whether the test item was a lie or a truth. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the moderator analysis on d' showed that the sex X 
primary psychopathy interaction was significant (Δ R2 = .027,  β = -.36, t = -3.18, p = 
.002).The interaction between sex X secondary psychopathy was also significant (Δ R2 = 
.038, , β = .28, t = 2.47, p = .02), but notably went in the opposite direction than the other 
interaction term. In order to control for shared variance between the psychopathy sub-facets 
(r = .65 for women, and r = .66 for men, p = .001), we conducted partial correlations 
separately for sexes for primary psychopathy, d’ and c’ (while controlling for secondary 
psychopathy), and secondary psychopathy, d’ and c’ (while controlling for primary 
psychopathy) (See Table 2 for both partial and zero-order correlations). The Fisher’s Z 
indicated that primary psychopathy was associated with more accurate detection deception in 
men, but not in women. In contrast, we observed the opposite pattern with secondary 
psychopathy; deception accuracy and secondary psychopathy in men had a non-significant 
negative trend, and in women, a non-significant positive trend. No variables appeared to be 
associated with changes in bias, c, indicating that psychopathy was not related to the 
tendency to label truth-tellers as liars. 
    
Discussion 
We found that primary psychopathy related to increased lie detection accuracy in 
men, and decreased accuracy in women, supporting the idea that primary psychopathy is a 
male-typical adaptation (Jonason et al., 2008), and relates to differential socio-emotional 
processing depending on the sex of the individual (Jonason et al., 2013). Women had a higher 
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overall accuracy than men had, but there were no sex differences in the bias in labelling 
participants as liars. Furthermore, participants performed above chance, in line with 
O’Sullivan, Frank, Hurley and Tiwana (2009), but contrary to findings reported by Vrij and 
Mann (2001). Finally, we observed a slight liberal bias across all participants in labelling the 
test stimuli as liars, which was not significantly affected by sex or psychopathy. Overall, our 
results highlight the importance of investigating deception detection ability differentially in 
women and men, and within the context of individual differences in personality. 
 Our results suggest that sex may moderate the relationship between lie detection and 
psychopathy. In men, primary psychopathy had a positive relationship with lie detection 
ability, whereas in women, primary psychopathy was associated to lower lie detection scores. 
This finding supports the idea that primary psychopathy is a male-specific adaptation, linked 
to competition for mates and social status (Jonason et al., 2009). The high-powered 
occupations desired by successful primary psychopaths (Boddy, 2006) would certainly 
benefit from the ability to process deceptive information accurately. Primary psychopathy 
could be qualitatively different between the sexes (Wynn, Høiseth, & Pettersen, 2012), and 
has differential effects on empathy depending on the sex of the participant (Jonason et al., 
2013). It is possible that men and women use different routes to achieving accuracy in lie 
detection. Therefore, it would be beneficial to include sex as a moderator in future studies 
investigating psychopathy and deception detection. 
In addition, in women, there was a non-significant positive trend between secondary 
psychopathy and lie detection accuracy, whereas in men, there was a non-significant negative 
trend. Although only trends, these findings tentatively suggest that secondary psychopathy, at 
least for men, is the less successful sub-facet of the psychopathy construct, relating to 
impaired processing of important social information (Gao & Raine, 2010).A possible 
explanation for the positive trend in women could be the presence of a link between 
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secondary psychopathy and an overactive threat-detection system in women. Attachment 
anxiety, which also has an association with hyper-vigilance (Ein-Dor, Mikulincer, Doron, & 
Shaver, 2010), relates to increased lie detection ability (Ein-Dor & Perry, 2013), as well as to 
higher scores on a secondary psychopathy measure (Mack, Hackney, & Pyle, 2011). Anxious 
attachment is more common in women than in men, and has been proposed as an adaptive, 
female-typical mechanism for detecting threats in the environment (Del Giudice, 2011). 
Perhaps there are common links between hyper-vigilance, attachment anxiety, and secondary 
psychopathy, resulting in better lie detection in women, and impaired lie detection in men. 
These proposed links certainly warrant further investigations in future studies.  
The enhanced lie detection ability of women in our sample is intriguing, and 
contradicts the study of Baker et al (in press), who found that emotional intelligence 
(typically higher in women, see Schutte et al., 1998) relates to higher gullibility when 
identifying liars. Women may rely more on intuition when processing subliminal emotional 
cues (Donges, Kersting, & Suslow, 2012), which could be an asset in deception detection 
tasks (Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009).  Furthermore, research has found that when 
processing socio-emotional information, women use more often emotional brain areas (such 
as the amygdala), whereas men are more likely to rely on the activation of cortical areas 
related to logical processing (Derntl et al., 2010). It is possible that women have an advantage 
over men in high-stake, emotional lie detection, where accuracy may partially relate to the 
use of intuition. 
We also found that our participants were, overall, more accurate than chance when 
judging the lies. Our stimulus set comprised of high-stakes emotional lies, which could be 
easier to detect than non-emotional lies (Warren, Schertler, & Bull, 2009). Research using 
stimulus from real life situations is in its infancy (Porter and ten Brinke, 2010), and future 
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research should focus on investigating individual differences in personality in judging 
stimulus where there may be higher emotional leakage in the lies.  
In conclusion, we believe that individual differences in lie detection are an important 
avenue of investigation, and that more research should concentrate on using high-stakes 
emotional lies, as these might have higher ecological validity than other types of stimulus 
(see O’Sullivan, 2008, for methodological criticism). Furthermore, it is important to account 
for sex differences in individual differences in question, as these may relate to lie detection 
differently depending on the sex of the judge. The callous and unemotional features of 
primary psychopathy could be of advantage for men in the lie detection context, but have less 
importance for women. It is likely that the evolutionary pressures behind each sub-facet of 
psychopathy are quite different for both sexes, and lead to different outcomes in processing 
of socio-emotional information. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and sex differences for the measures 
 Mean (SD)  t-test        Cohen’s d 
 
  Total Male Female 
Primary Psychopathy 82.52 (19.74) 92.42 (19.33) 75.90 (17.16) 5.48** 0.90 
Secondary Psychopathy 72.85 (17.50) 79.95 (18.76) 68.11 (14.93) 4.29** 0.70 
d’ 0.86 (0.64) 0.72 (0.70) 0.95 (0.58) -2.25* 0.36 
c -0.06 (0.31) -0.11 (0.32) -0.04 (0.29) -1.46 0.23 
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 Table 2. Partial and zero-order correlations for d’, c’ and psychopathy (controlling for 
secondary/primary psychopathy) (zero-order correlations in parentheses) 
 
  r     










d’ .18 (.02) -.22 (-.06) -2.33* -.24* (-.16) .26* (.16) 2.93**  
c -.14 (-.08) .04 (-.05) -1.04 -.13 (.06) -.09 (-.10) 0.23  
* p < .05, ** p < .01        
 
 
